Lessons from Zero-Covid Lockdown Policies:
Revisiting Factors of PRC State-Resilience vs. State-Collapse
Mark Godges 高勉正
Sociology of Organizations and Sustainability Issues
Submitted on June 3rd, 2022
University of Geneva
Research Question
Do the PRC’s Zero-Covid Lockdown Policies set the stage for State Collapse?
Introduction
This paper seeks to analyze the PRC’s recent zero-covid lockdown policies spearheaded by Xi Jinping in the context of sociological theories relating to organizations’ varying abilities to adapt to external factors which increasingly threaten their existence. I situate these theories around the research question by exploring insights from Perrow, Axelrod and Hollnagel. I explore how these theories relate to ongoing events and policies under construction regarding the maintenance of what Hobbe’s called the “social contract” in the context of the People’s Republic of China. I first review the historical background of patterns of social contract theory in China to better explain how the current social contract came to be, where the majority of Chinese citizens have traded politics for economic stability (with notable exceptions occurring in situations such as the Tiananmen Uprising and Massacre in 1989). I then review how the current social and economic unrest with Xi Jinping’s zero-covid lockdown policies represents the first breach to the current social contract. I review factors of the party-state’s inability to respond to an exacerbated crisis or similar issues which may come up in the future by exploring concepts such as face, organizational and social cohesion, and proactive vs. reactive policymaking. I then argue that the zero-covid lockdown policies and the economic and social disruption they have caused represent a greater shift of both increasing inflexibility of leadership and increasing irritation among Chinese and citizens of other nations to behavior based on cultural or historical claims with no basis in treaties or international law. I argue that if Xi Jinping and his allies continue on this path, it will eventually bring the downfall of the Communist Party of China by circling back to different decisions which could break the social contract that the Communist Party made with their people during reconstruction from the great famine and the cultural revolution. I contend that Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (NAT) has gained in relevance, as High-Reliability Theory (HRT) of the party-state engaging in preventative and proactive policymaking will not work if they cannot engage in both short-term and long-term planning. In order to deal with an uptick in disasters making proactive policies that can adapt to immediate and unexpected emergencies or variables will be necessary. Therefore, the ability for the Communist Party of China to learn from its current failures to deal with graver problems in the future will determine whether it can be a story of organizational resilience or state-collapse facilitated by an honoring or a breach in the social contract.
Historical Background and Defining “State Collapse”
When looking at the impact of the PRC’s Zero-Covid Lockdown policies today, tracing transitioning social contracts in China over time may support analysis of whether the current crisis matches the level of three previous crises which created transformational regime change in China. If one looks at state-resilience as the upholding of the social contract between state and citizens, and state-collapse as the social contract breaking, then we can analyze the factors of collapse (normal accident theory) next to the factors of resilience (organizational resilience theory) to project potential outcomes of the current political and economic situation regarding Covid-lockdowns and increased economic isolationism of the PRC. In order to understand how the current lead-up to, immediate impact of, and long-term implications of China’s Zero-Covid lockdown policies relate to the collapse or resilience of the Party-State to maintain its legitimacy and therefore its grip on Chinese society, a historical perspective on the relevance of Hobbes’s social contract theory in China must be brought to the forefront.
Since the collapse of the short lived Republican era in China into eventual victory in the War of Resistance (抗战), the social contract between the Chinese people and the rule of the party state has been created and solidified in two primary ways: 1) Protection from invaders and occupiers, and 2) Protection from famine and instability. The original contract in the wake of the fall of the Qing Dynasty was, to paraphrase, “support the Republic of China and we will give you freedom and stability”. The inability of the ROC leadership to stop the war of resistance devastated China, and unexpected victory with the United States in the wake of the two atomic bombs gave Mao’s leadership legitimacy, as he famously said that “The Chinese people have stood up”. In this era of the War of Resistance (known in Europe as the Second World War) and the Post-War Era, the social contract was clear: “support the party-state and we will continue to protect you from the Japanese invaders and all others who seek to undermine our sovereignty and collective safety”. However, Mao’s reign in the long-term proved to be devastating for China because of the two major policy failures of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Famine.
When Deng Xiaoping ascended to power, he de-Maoified Chinese economic policies by setting into motion long-term trends of reform (改革开放). In the reform era, the social contract transferred from simply “support the party-state and we will protect you from outsiders” to “support the (new model of the) party-state and we will make sure you are fed. clothed and housed.” However, since the Modern PRC economy was fueled by integration and policies of reform and opening up, the recent clampdown on entrepreneurship in conjunction with lockdowns and economic protectionism is putting the current social contract from Deng at risk. When people were denied food and food could not be transported to people’s homes in the midst of Covid-lockdowns, Shanghai experienced social unrest in a way not seen in decades. The concept of face (面子) exacerbates the legitimacy issue when crises happen in urban centers, so when rural areas or areas which are still developing in China do not have food or basic infrastructure, there are ways to manage it. However, when weeks long food crises happen in Shanghai, it calls into question the legitimacy of the state as it loses face.
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
The research question Do the PRC’s Zero-Covid Lockdown Policies provide insight to future State Collapse? can and must be answered in a multidimensional way, as the lines between domestic and international policy making in the 21stCentury are becoming increasingly blurred. The first dimension relating to the research question has to do with Normal Accident Theory (Perrow), analyzing whether the conditions external to the party-state apparatus make it impossible for the party-state to respond to and explain compounding crises efficiently and effectively. The second dimension relating to the research question has to do with The Factors of Organizational Resilience (Hollnagel), analyzing the internal factors which may empower or weaken the party-state’s ability to respond to compounding crises efficiently and effectively. The third dimension relating to the research question has to do with the Logic of Cooperation Theory (Axelrod), analyzing the mutually dependent variables of willingness for leadership of both the US and Allies’ and the PRC to cooperate rather than compete.
In Complexity, Tight-Coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory, Rijpma compares[i] the key differences between the Normal Accident Theory (Perrow) and the High Reliability Theory (La Porte cum Rochlin) in the context of major disasters or near misses at nuclear power plants, in the United States nuclear weapons system, or with the success or failure to launch spacecrafts containing human beings into outer space. The overall conclusion which the study made is that there are generally too many variables in any situation to give a definitive answer on whether the normal accident theory can be proven, because every situation is different. In other words, if nuclear accidents were avoided in similar facilities to the one which hosted the Three Mile Island incident — there could always be explanations for why that particular situation was unique. Such reasoning may prove the NAT to be correct, as Rijpma explains the same reasoning was used to say that near misses in the US nuclear weapons system were avoided not because of an immunity to NAT, but because of enough consideration of their variables through High Reliability Theory to avoid disaster. However, since the Normal Accident Theory and the High Reliability Theory are the reverse of one another, Ripjma contends they can also feed into each other. When systems are built to be integrated as preventative mechanisms for accidents, when part of the system collapse a domino effect can ensue. We saw this in particular during the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the USSR. The USSR had a security apparatus in all of its satellite states to reduce uncertainty of state collapse, but as soon as one satellite state security apparatus collapsed, that then opened the door for the others and undermined the systemic foundations of Soviet state security. In the context of the PRC’s current zero-covid lockdown policies, they were created as a response to waves of Covid (reactive policy) and vaccines which are about 40% as effective as Pfizer. Since the food, work and school systems depend on free movement and sufficient bodily resistance to viruses, when the ability to withstand the virus requires complete lockdowns, the other three pillars which uphold the post-Mao social contract become more fragile.
In How Resilient is your Organization? An Introduction to the Resilience Analysis Grid, Hollnagel reviews[ii] the differences between organizational safety and organizational resilience. His basic point is that an organization that is resilient is safe, but the opposite is not necessarily true. He states four major pillars of organizational resilience capabilities: response, monitoring, anticipation, and learning. Whereas organizational safety seeks to reduce the harm which comes from adverse events, organizational resilience seeks to build capacity to continue operations while being affected as little as possible by hostile environments or actors. In the context of the PRC’s current zero covid lockdown policies we can see such policies as coming from the mindset of organizational safety rather than organizational resilience. If the PRC had used a vaccine that worked, developed efficient and quick transportation routes for food, and/or reduced corruption within the police force to be paid off to allow residents to gain access to food and other basic necessities, then social unrest and political fragility in Shanghai and elsewhere could be avoided. However, when an organization is not resilient in anticipating effects or hostile environments or actors, they will also not be able to properly respond. The concept of face also makes the learning aspect of organizational resilience particularly difficult in Confucian one-party states, thus entrapping their policymakers in cycles of ensuring short-term organizational safety without using past failures as lessons for long-term organizational resilience.
In The Evolution of Cooperation, Axelrod explores[iii] what conditions allow for cooperation among rivals or enemies in what he calls a “world of egoists”. In the classic prisoner’s dilemma, he reviews the power-game of rational actors sacrificing power for each other for mutual benefit, but only if they trust the other actor won’t simply take their power (money, life, country, etc.) and run. He provides two examples of this: 1) individual soldiers breaking orders from high command in World War I to feed each other and ensure each other’s survival, and 2) the preconditions of mutually assured destruction during the Cold War encouraging neither the United States nor the USSR to engage in thermonuclear warfare. He argues that this mutual sacrifice between adversaries is what is needed to defy the “blind forces of history”. In the context of what set the stage for a responsive and reactive policy of organizational safety rather than a proactive policy of organizational resilience, The PRC chose to try their hand at nationalist competition of vaccine effectiveness rather than global cooperation of vaccine distribution with American or Western vaccines they know are effective. This is an example of taking the selfish rather than cooperative choice in the prisoner’s dilemma and losing face.
If the reader 1) defines “state collapse” as the breaking of social contract (Hobbes) with Chinese cultural and historical norms in consideration, and 2) matches the theories of Axelrod, Perrow, and Hollnagel to respective situations of internal/external party-state dynamics in 2022, then we can begin to conceptualize measurable indicators for projecting organizational resilience or organizational collapse within the Communist Party of China. The compounding crises of pandemics, climate change and economic instability inevitably pose existential risks to the social contract of Modern China thus posing the risk of state collapse as defined by the nation-state as the social contract between a state and its people. Variables which have sprung from the internal consequences of the zero-covid lockdown are increased party factionalism based on wariness of increased social contract fragility. This has brought to the forefront a new Chinese leader who was once brushed aside, Li Keqiang, along with those in his faction. Organizational resilience will necessitate complete unity throughout disagreements, but if the state is defined by its leader (个人崇拜) rather than by the party-state leadership collectively (集体共同), than increased personality worship may be a hindrance to state stability in the event of a major leadership dispute. External factors include increased isolation from the west before the PRC is able to fully self-sustain itself and its major industries with no import-export support from the United States, Europe, or Japan. Should this happen, it will weaken the economy and lead to more economic unrest, which could be exacerbated if climate change is viewed as an issue of “national security” as stated by Xi Jinping rather than one of “global cooperation” stated by Axelrod. The paranoia of a taking a state-centric view to global crises increases risk of both internal factionalism (as a response to lack of organizational resilience) and decreased cooperation from Western trading partners (national competition rather than global cooperation), creating more breaches of the post-Mao social contract between the party state and Chinese citizens leading to state collapse from compounding health, environmental, and economic crises — confirming Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory as inevitable under certain circumstances.
Conclusion
There are a number of indicators which can be used to measure the resilience or gradual collapse of the Chinese party-state over time, by seeing how different variables can put dents in the post-Mao social contract between the party-state and its citizens. When dents are made in the social contract, it will also test organizational resilience and the ability of the party-state to adapt to adverse and unseen situations — thus provoking instability within the regime and hindering its ability to respond to threats to the regime itself. In the case of zero-covid lockdown policies championed by Xi Jinping, they represent a direct threat to the social contract as they inhibit people’s ability to work, go to school, and gain access to food. This has of course caused issues within the regime itself, as leaders which are more economically and less ideologically minded will begin to gain legitimacy in questioning Xi.
Indicators of leadership and social divisions can measure organizational resilience of the party-state and nation. Indicators of the speed which military, health, economic, and environmental threats to state legitimacy increase can measure the threat level in relation to the organizational cohesion required to respond. The first indicator of internal leadership division and the breaking of party unity can be measured by the amounts of openly contradictory statements or actions between PRC leaders over a given period of time. In particular, the clique represented by Li Keqiang, Hu Chunhua, and Wang Yang are becoming more openly contradictory to Xi’s vision and goals, which indicates a slip of power from a single source. The second indicator of internal division among society can be measured by different issues of polarization which can damage the social cohesion of the Chinese people and turn them against each other. As Professor Yan Xuetong notes, the war in Ukraine is one issue which has left different factions of Chinese people turned against each other, indicating a lack of national unity on China’s outward foreign policy towards the world in addition to a lack of internal unity on domestic policy. The third indicator of rate of increase in climate disasters, especially those effecting densely-populated cities measure a direct threat to party-state legitimacy regarding narratives of infrastructure and economic development. If party-state infrastructure is development is built without sensitivity to local climate threats, hundreds of thousands of people’s lives and livelihoods can be destroyed in weeks. A recent example of this came during the Henan floods, causing the evacuation of 800,000 people and $12.7B USD worth of property damage. Where free market societies can adapt to such disasters on the fly, state-run economies with centralized economic command centers provide fertile ground for quarrels and internal hostility and little room for experimentation. The fourth indicator of sanctions and economic isolation which could come from an invasion of Taiwan measure a more serious threat to the narratives of the party state whereas economic development, riches and prestige, or even basic educational or occupational needs can be seen as a step forward, not being able to provide food to the people represents a direct breach in the post-Mao social contract. Therefore the decision to invade Taiwan and the food security issues which would ensue as a result for the Chinese people will have a boomerang effect, therefore allowing the invasion decision to have a direct correlation to future state collapse.
However, zero-covid lockdown policies only represent the tip of the iceberg as a model of understanding the PRC’s impending challenges in maintaining their regime. They have fed their people a lie that Taiwan is a part of China, even though it has not been a part of China since the Qing Dynasty when it was ceded to Japan in the first Sino-Japanese War. In the wake of Japanese Unconditional Surrender, the Treaty of San Francisco which is recognized by the world outside of Beijing as the end to World War II does not specify Taiwan’s territorial status. However, due to the concept of face, when the leaders make a promise, they must follow through: as seen by the inability of Xi Jinping and his allies to back out of zero-covid lockdown policies. Additionally, as seen by the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an invasion of Taiwan by Beijing will pose a serious threat to the PRC as there will likely be a sanctions regime which includes not only the original nations that went after Russia, but also countries in Asia that have a bone to pick with China as well. By inflaming historical tensions over an obsession with face and party loyalty, imports Beijing depends on to survive will not come, and the Allies will simply reroute supply chains to go around them.
Since Deng based the post-Mao social contract on economic development and what Xi calls a “moderately prosperous society” through integrating into the global market, when the global market turns on them, their own social contract will collapse. Therefore, Axelrod’s theory of cooperation makes sense regarding what the zero-covid lockdown policies tell us regarding China’s future. However, it makes sense only in the context of the refusal to cooperate and one side inevitably failing. As democratic societies inevitably have the decision-making structures to deal with compounding crises as they happen, totalitarian regimes build their power on predictability, and therefore operate on a model of organizational safety rather than organizational resilience. Resilient systems are not incentivized to work with non-resilient enemies if they are not on the same level, as were the examples shown by the trench warriors in World War I or the nuclear weapons systems of the US and the USSR. The 1) interdependence of western economies with the PRC, 2) the willingness or western economies to decouple, 3) the lack of organizational resilience for the CPC to deal with the fall out, and 4) the willingness to risk state collapse to save face, will ultimately prove to be the downfall of the Communist Party of China. The social-behavioral models shown by splits in both central and local leadership from, irrational zero-covid lockdown policies provide insight to the lack of organizational resilience of the largest totalitarian regime on the planet to deal with more serious social, environmental, economic and public health crises in the future.
